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Case No. 20080377-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. The State Failed to Prove a Sufficient Nexus Between Yohannes and the 
Financial Card to Show Control and Intent Under Utah Code Annotated § 
76-6-506.3 (2003) 
"To find that a defendant had constructive possession of ... contraband, it is 
necessary to prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the 
[contraband] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the [contraband]." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985). In State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32, 122 P.3d 639, the Utah Supreme 
Court listed several factors that "may be important in determining whether the nexus in a 
particular case is sufficient, including ownership and/or occupancy of the residence or 
vehicle where the [contraband was] found, defendant's proximity to the [contraband]... 
incriminating statements or behavior, presence of [contraband] in a specific area where 
the defendant had control, etc." 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also issued a caveat about "mechanically 
relying on a list of factors ... ." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15, 985 P.2d 911. 
Moreover, these factors are "not 'universally pertinent,' and ... 'no such list is 
exhaustive, and that listed factors are only considerations.'" Workman, 2005 UT at f 32 
(quoting Layman, 1999 UT at f 14-15). Whether there is a sufficient nexus "depends on 
the facts and circumstances of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Yohannes asserts that 
in this case this Court should consider the evidence "within the totality of the 
circumstances presented[,]" State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 1998), and 
"whether there was a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the [financial card] to 
permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise 
control over the [financial card]." Layman, 1999 UT at^[ 15 (emphasis added). In 
addition, "although circumstantial evidence may be enough to prove constructive 
possession, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that 
[Yohannes] committed each element of the crime charged." Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 
UT App 61,110, 975 P.2d 501 (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 
1993)). 
A. Insufficient evidence existed at trial to prove Yohannes had dominion and 
control over the financial card 
The State relies on some of the factors used in State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 
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32, 122 P.3d 639, to determine whether a sufficient nexus existed between Yohannes and 
the financial card (Appellee Br. at 8-9). The State claims that the debit card's presence in 
Yohannes's locked vehicle is significant (Appellee Br. at 9). When isolated, the fact that 
the debit card was found in Yohannes's locked vehicle is suggestive, but alone is 
insufficient. See State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985) (holding that "[ownership 
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs are found, although important 
factors, are not alone sufficient to establish constructive possession, especially when 
occupancy is not exclusive."). Here, any number of persons had access to Yohannes's 
vehicle, especially because his keys were missing (R. 149: 121) and the vehicle was not 
secured and was accessible through the sunroof (R. 149: 99-100). 
Furthermore, the State erroneously claims that "[njothing in the record suggests 
that any person other than the defendant has access to and control over the car ..." 
(Appellee Br. at 9). It is undisputed in the record that Yohannes's keys were missing (R. 
149: 121) and mysteriously reappeared only after Westfahl discovered them in one of 
Yohannes's bags (R. 149: 122). Furthermore, the investigating officer testified that 
because the sunroof was not fully secured a person could get into the vehicle without 
keys (R. 149: 99-100). Clearly, during this time any number of people could have had 
access to Yohannes' car. 
Also, the State claims that because Yohannes may have suspected Westfahl of 
vandalizing his computer and taking his car keys, an inference of constructive possession 
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exists. The State's analysis is misplaced. Even if Yohannes was "enraged" about the 
situation, this behavior is not incriminating to the point that one could reasonably infer 
that Yohannes had control over the card. See, State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 
1985) (citing United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant nodded 
affirmatively when introduced as owner of cocaine)). In fact, there was no evidence 
introduced at trial that Yohannes had made any incriminating statements about the debit 
card. See Bryan, 99 UT App 61 at f 9 (A factor weighing against conviction in a 
constructive possession case based on circumstantial evidence was that "defendant made 
no statements, incriminating or otherwise"). 
Finally, and most importantly, the State presented no evidence that Yohannes 
either possessed or attempted to use the financial card. At trial, the State stipulated to the 
fact that fingerprints were indeed found on the financial card, but they did not belong to 
Yohannes (Stipulated Exhibit #3). Furthermore, no evidence was presented that 
Yohannes either used or attempted to use the financial card. 
Under Layman, this Court should consider all the evidence "within the totality of 
the circumstances presented." Layman, 953 P.2d at 789. In light of the facts as presented 
above, there is an "[in]sufficient nexus between the accused and the [financial card] to 
permit an inference" that Yohannes had the power to exercise control over it. State v. 
Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
B. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Yohannes intended to use 
the debit card in violation of Utah Code § 76-6-503.2 (2007) 
"Knowledge and ability to possess do not equal possession where there is no 
evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 
316, 319 (Utah 1985). Accord State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah App. 1986). 
Here, the State argues that because Yohannes may have been upset with Westfahl 
because he suspected him of causing $100 damage to his computer, there is a reasonable 
inference that Yohannes took the card without permission in order to use it to repair the 
damage (Appellee Br. at 10-12). While that is a possible inference, it is insufficient to 
establish intent. 
Other facts overcome the speculation that Yohannes possessed the card with intent 
to use it. First, evidence showed that Yohannes probably did not possess the card. When 
the card was retrieved by police a fingerprint was found on it, but not Yohannes' 
(Stipulated Exhibit #3). This indicates that if he never "possessed" it, he could not have 
intended to use it. Second, evidence showed that the debit card was never used (R. 149: 
136). From the time Westfahl discovered his card missing, June 4th or 5th to the time 
officers seized the card on June 8th there was sufficient time for Yohannes to have 
allegedly used the card (R. 149: 115-16; 128; 149: 91-92). Together, these facts 
overcome any perceived possibility or conjecture that Yohannes intended to use the card. 
See Layman, 953 P.2d at 792. The State presented no evidence to show that the card was 
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used or that there was even an attempt to use it. 
By this logic, even absurd factual situations could result in a conviction of Utah 
Code § 76-6-506.3 (2003). For example, imagine a man has just taken a woman out for 
dinner and a movie. At the conclusion of the date, when he is dropping his date off at 
home, her credit card accidentally falls from her purse onto the floor of his car. 
Disillusioned by the date, the man returns to his apartment and shares his regret with his 
roommates, calling the date a waste of time and stating that he would like his money 
back. The next day, on his way to work, this man finds the woman's credit card and 
places it in his glove compartment for safe keeping until he can return it. The woman, 
panicked about her missing card, suspects that maybe the man from her date took it. If 
police found the card in the man's possession and were privy of his statements about him 
wanting his money back, under the State's logic, this would be sufficient to convict him 
of unlawful possession of a financial card. This would be a considerable stretch to 
conclude that the man had control and intended to use the card. Here too it would be 
unreasonable to find that, under the totality of the circumstances, a person could find a 
sufficient nexus between Yohannes and the financial card to show that he had control and 
intended to use the card. See Utah Code § 76-6-506.3 (2003). 
Furthermore, even if the evidence presented at trial was sufficient, it was only 
sufficient to prove motive to obtain the card, not intent to use the card. "Motive describes 
the reason a person chooses to commit a crime. The reason, however, is different from a 
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required mental state such as intent or malice." People v. Hillhouse, 27 Cal.4th 469, 504, 
40 P.3d 754 (Cal. 2002). See also State v. Rosales, 136 N.M. 25, 30, 94 P.3d 768 (N.M. 
2004) ("Motive ... is the inducement which impels or leads the mind to indulge in a 
criminal act."); State v. Yarbrough, 210 P.3d 1029, 1038 (Wash Ct. App. 2009) 
("[M]otive is not synonymous with intent. Intent is the mental state with which the 
criminal act is committed. Motive is an inducement which tempts a mind to commit a 
crime.") (internal citations omitted). 
Here, the facts set forth by the State were merely proof of motive, not intent, and 
therefore are insufficient to prove intent to use a financial card. The State claims that 
Yohannes suspected his roommate to have (1) sabotaged his computer; and (2) taken his 
car keys, which cost Yohannes money to repair and replace (Appellee Br. at 10-12). 
Even if the State's hypothesis were true and Yohannes did believe that his roommate had 
damaged his computer and taken his keys, Yohannes' frustration demonstrates only 
motive to use the financial card, not intent as required under Utah Code § 76-6-503.3 
(2003). This evidence merely describes why Yohannes would want to take the financial 
card; intent, however, requires something different. Evidence at trial never demonstrated 
an intent to use the financial card. In fact, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion: 
Yohannes' fingerprints were never found on the card and there was no evidence 
presented that the card was ever used. Because the trial evidence was proof of motive 
and not intent, the second prong of the analysis necessarily fails, thus creating a 
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significant deficiency in evidence and a reasonable doubt as to Yohannes' guilt. 
As this Court concluded in Layman, "any significant deficiency in evidence 
establishing the nexus almost always leaves room for those 'reasonable hypothes[es] of 
innocence' which 'necessarily raise[ ] a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.'" 
Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 792 (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)). Here, 
the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Yohannes (1) possessed the 
debit card; and (2) intended to use it. Accordingly, "the necessary nexus between [him] 
and the [transaction card] does not exist... [and] neither possibilities nor probabilities can 
substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at f 10. As 
such, this Court should reverse Yohannes' conviction on the ground of insufficient 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Yohannes asks that this Court reverse his conviction because the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he committed the crime of unlawful acquisition, possession 
or transfer of a financial transaction card. 
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of September, 2009. 
MARGARET P. LII 
Counsel for Appellant 
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